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High-energy astrophysical events that cause galaxy-scale extinctions have been proposed as a way
to explain or mollify the Fermi Paradox, by making the universe at earlier times more dangerous for
evolving life, and reducing its present-day prevalence. Here, we present an anthropic argument that
a more dangerous early universe can have the opposite effect, actually increasing estimates for the
amount of visible extragalactic life at the present cosmic time. This occurs when civilizations are
assumed to expand and displace possible origination sites for the evolution of life, and estimates are
made by assuming that humanity has appeared at a typical time. The effect is not seen if advanced
life is assumed to always remain stationary, with no displacement of habitable worlds.
It has been proposed that the universe was a much
more dangerous place for the evolution of intelligent life
at earlier times [1–6]. The idea is attractive for under-
standing the Fermi Paradox, as it makes the Great Si-
lence [7] seem less paradoxical. When applied to the
universe as a whole (e.g. for the development of extra-
galactic SETI [8–11]), the idea comes at the cost of the
mediocrity principle, as it puts us at a special cosmic
time – near the beginning of the time-of-arrival distribu-
tion for comparable life, PTOA(t).
This letter is to point out a context in which invoking
a more dangerous early universe has the opposite effect,
actually increasing estimates for the number of visible
expansionistic Kardashev type iii+ civilizations [12] (we
denote expanding galaxy engineers as K3+), and improv-
ing the prospects for extragalactic SETI. This can hap-
pen when two elements are simultaneously present in the
reasoning used to make estimates:
1. Advanced life is assumed to expand and eventually
displace a large fraction of habitable worlds that
would otherwise be potential sites for the appear-
ance and evolution of life. I.e. the rate at which ex-
pansionistic life appears at early cosmic times will
affect the appearance rate of life at later cosmic
times.
2. A “typicality assumption” for humanity’s cosmic
time of arrival is used to estimate the probability
for advanced life to successfully evolve on a hab-
itable world. This is a form of anthropic reason-
ing that implicitly uses the self-sampling assump-
tion [13]. It will not so much matter which typical-
ity assumption is used, so long as one is used.
Because of the first element, the shape of the time-
of-arrival distribution PTOA(t) (from which humanity is
assumed to be randomly drawn) will respond in an am-
plified way to the deletion of early expansionistic civi-
lizations. The typicality assumption will then imply a
larger, compensating estimate for the probability of ad-
vanced life to appear on habitable worlds that have not
experienced a major extinction event, with the net effect
that we estimate more K3+’s in our past light cone.
The described effect is not a pathological case – in-
deed, it can be seen in previously published calculations
that considered a number of increasingly severe evolu-
tionary risk functions in the early universe, though the
effect we describe here was not identified at the time [14].
Although we will see this effect to be generic, it is not
impossible to avoid. It remains possible to back-engineer
a risk function, such that we would estimate fewer visible
K3+’s as a result of increased danger.
To be specific, let us express the appearance rate for
advanced technological life (per unit comoving volume,
per unit cosmic time) as f(t) = αF (t), where F (t) rep-
resents the rate at which approximately suitable plane-
tary conditions have occurred (e.g. an Earthlike planet
has appeared in the habitable zone of a sun-like star for
sufficient time without experiencing a catastrophic ex-
tinction event), and α represents the conditional proba-
bility that advanced technological life will actually occur,
given such planetary conditions. The time variable here
is cosmic time, and these rates are averaged across the
universe. We can then express the normalized time-of-
arrival distribution as:
PTOA(t) = N
−1f(t) (1)
with the normalizing factor given by N =
∫∞
0
f(t)dt.
Now, if advanced life does not displace potential appear-
ance sites, one can see that PTOA(t) does not depend on
α – it is canceled by the normalizing factor. Invoking a
more dangerous early universe changes the rate of suit-
able planetary conditions F (t) such that early parts of
PTOA(t) are suppressed, and the present cosmic time, t0,
becomes an unusually early time for us to have arrived.
This is a trade-off – less observable life now (regardless
of α), in exchange for straining the mediocrity principle.
However, if we assume that advanced life displaces a
significant fraction of possible origination sites, the pic-
ture changes. Let g(t) be the fraction of possible orig-
ination sites that have not been displaced. Now, the
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2time-of-arrival distribution is:
PTOA(t) = N
−1f(t)g(t) (2)
with the normalizing factor now given by N =∫∞
0
f(t)g(t) dt. This introduces an α-dependence to
PTOA, since g(t) should depend on the absolute appear-
ance rate of advanced life.
Before going any further, notice that models for F (t)
and g(t) can be constructed and defended, based on spe-
cific assumptions about planet formation rates, techno-
logical limits and selection effects driving the behavior of
expansionistic life. Basic features of F (t) have been in-
ferred with reasonable confidence [15, 16], and the devel-
opment of technology on the Earth suggests conservative
bounds on what should be possible for a technologically
mature species [17]. Drivers for expansionist behavior are
discussed e.g. in [18, 19]. Such issues are by no means
settled, but one can imagine constraints and guiding prin-
ciples that would partition the space of possibilities into a
small set of consistent pictures. By contrast, we are hope-
lessly uncertain over many orders of magnitude, where
α is concerned [20], with essentially no hope for a mi-
croscopic theory to inform us in the foreseeable future.
Because PTOA(t) depends on such an uncertain param-
eter, the mediocrity principle is one of the few tools at
our disposal for making quantitative predictions. To get
estimates, we can demand that humanity has appeared
at some “typical” time, e.g. at the mean or median time
of arrival, or n standard deviations from the mean (for
setting bounds). This will fix α to a particular value,
depending on the models used for F (t) and g(t). One
can then calculate the expected number of K3+’s that
appear in our past light cone, for the set of assumptions.
Our argument turns on the observation that, in mod-
els with strong displacement, F (t) by itself says almost
nothing about our relative time of arrival. This is be-
cause any plausible model for F (t) can be paired with
an equally-acceptable value of α (according to an unin-
formative prior, such as Lacki’s Log-Log prior [20]) such
that our appearance here at t0 meets a typicality assump-
tion. If the typicality assumption is our only basis for se-
lecting α (anthropic reasoning), then the effect of varying
F (t) by amount δF (t) to make the early universe more
hostile, e.g. to account for high-energy events, must be
calculated while holding the typicality assumption con-
stant, meaning that α must be varied to compensate.
As a thought experiment to see how this reasoning will
play out, imagine a proposal that the universe were ex-
tremely dangerous for a brief time, one million years ago,
causing a temporary, universe-wide halt to the appear-
ance of K3+ life. What is the net effect on estimates
of the number of visible K3+’s from the Earth? One
million years is not enough time for light to arrive from
distant, expansionistic galaxy engineers, so effects during
the dangerous time itself cannot directly affect our esti-
mates. Nevertheless, PTOA(t) will be altered, because
rapidly expanding civilizations would otherwise be dis-
placing an increasing number of planets at all times in
the future. So this particular proposal means we will have
to increase our estimate for α slightly to retain our cho-
sen typicality assumption. This increase in α will have
observable consequences, because it affects the absolute
appearance rate within our entire past light cone. So the
net effect of postulating danger in the past has been that
we expect to see more advanced life, not less.
To examine this reasoning quantitatively, we function-
ally vary F (t) by a small amount δF (t) for times before
t0, with δF (t) taking negative values. To maintain the
typicality assumption, this requires that we vary α by an
amount δα to compensate. We will examine two typical-
ity assumptions, requiring that humanity (at t0) has ap-
peared at the mean or median time of arrival, so that we
have t0 = N
−1 ∫∞
0
tf(t)g(t)dt or 12 = N
−1 ∫ t0
0
f(t)g(t)dt
respectively, and then induce δF (t), to make the early
universe more hostile. To first order, this implies the
corresponding δα satisfies:
−δα
∫ ∞
0
(t− t0)F (t) ∂g(t)
∂α
dt =
∫ ∞
0
dt′ δF (t′)
[
(t′ − t0)g(t′) +
∫ ∞
0
(t− t0)F (t) δg(t)
δF (t′)
dt
]
(3)
for the mean time, or
−δα
∫ ∞
0
F (t)
∂g(t)
∂α
sgn(t0 − t) dt =
∫ ∞
0
dt′ δF (t′)
[
g(t′) sgn(t0 − t′) +
∫ ∞
0
F (t)
δg(t)
δF (t′)
sgn(t0 − t) dt
]
(4)
for the median.
To go further, we need to be specific about a model
for g(t). If g(t) is dominated by the actions of species
that use self-reproducing spacecraft to rapidly expand
their domain in all directions at an intergalactic scale
with speed v (a generic kind of behavior for a suffi-
ciently powerful agent wishing to maximize access to re-
sources [19], and one that seems quite possible for ma-
ture technology [21]), a model for the domain volume
occupied by a species that appears at t′ is given by
V (t′, t) = 4pi3
(∫ t
t′
v
a(t′′)dt
′′
)3
(with a(t) the cosmic scale
3factor). If such species appear at random in the universe
at rate f(t), and displace a large fraction of habitable
worlds within their occupied volume, we obtain the fol-
lowing model for g(t):
g(t) = e−
∫ t
0
f(t′)V (t′,t)dt′ . (5)
The collective time-dependence of such aggressively ex-
panding civilizations resembles a cosmological phase
transition [22], with g(t) taking the form of the Guth-
Tye-Weinberg formula [23, 24]. For such a model, the
derivatives appearing in equations 3 and 4 are:
∂g(t)
∂α
=
g(t) ln(g(t))
α
(6)
δg(t)
δF (t′)
= −αV (t′, t)g(t)Θ(t− t′) (7)
with Θ the Heaviside step function.
To determine the sign of δα, one can check the sign
of the integrals appearing in equations 3 and 4. A suf-
ficient condition for δα to be positive, is for δF (t) to be
negative and concentrated on times before t0, i.e. “mak-
ing the early universe more dangerous.” The meaning is
that deleting some of the early expanders with δF (t) has
the effect of pushing the average time of arrival to later
cosmic times, while increasing α (increasing the num-
ber of expanding civilizations at all times) has an op-
posite, compensating effect, tending to saturate the uni-
verse more quickly. The result is that δα must be positive
to maintain either typicality assumption.
The expected number (average) of such expanding civ-
ilizations appearing within our past light cone (but not
close enough to have reached our galaxy at speed v) is
given by:
Eobs =
(
c3
v3
− 1
)∫ t0
0
V (t′, t0)f(t′) dt′ (8)
The change in the expected number of such observable
civilizations, as a result of making the early universe more
hostile, is given by:
δEobs =
(
c3
v3
− 1
)∫ t0
0
V (t′, t0) [δαF (t′) + α δF (t′)] dt′.
(9)
The negative δF (t′) term decreases the visible number,
while δα increases it. To see the effect of varying F im-
pulsively at a particular time t¯, take δF (t) = − δ(t− t¯),
where  is positive and t¯ is earlier than t0. Then we
express the change in the number of visible expanding
civilizations as a function of t¯:
δEobs(t¯) = EobsY (t¯)−  α
(
c3
v3
− 1
)
V (t¯, t0) (10)
with Y (t¯) given by
Y (t¯)mean =
−(t¯− t0)g(t¯) + α
∫∞
t¯
(t− t0)F (t)g(t)V (t¯, t)dt
− ∫∞
0
(t− t0)F (t)g(t) ln(g(t))dt
(11)
for the mean typicality assumption, and
Y (t¯)med =
g(t¯)− α ∫∞
t¯
F (t)g(t)V (t¯, t) sgn(t0 − t) dt∫∞
0
F (t)g(t) ln(g(t)) sgn(t0 − t) dt
(12)
for the median.
In equation 10, the second (negative) term, and its
derivative, approach zero as t¯ approaches t0, while the
Y (t¯) term approaches a non-zero, positive value from
above, so there is guaranteed to be a window of time
before t0 when making the universe more hostile will in-
crease the expected number of visible civilizations. Fig-
ure 1 shows that this window can extend over nearly the
entire history of advanced life in the universe. For a
completely general variation, δEobs could be positive or
negative, depending on the shape of F (t) and the time
over which δF (t) is concentrated.
Similar results are seen for other useful typicality as-
sumptions, e.g. average plus n standard deviations, last
q-quantile, etc. though the full extent of the effect is
unknown. Our result is a demonstration that a coun-
terintuitive effect is present in scenarios with strong dis-
placement, but the boundaries are yet to be studied.
Four examples of δEobs(t¯)/ are depicted in figure 1b,
using mean and median typicality assumptions and two
different baseline functions for F (t), depicted in figure
1a. F1 is a step function, switching on a t = 6.5 Gyr,
while F2 is a more realistic life appearance rate (of the
type used in [14, 22, 25]). All cases assume a v = .3c
expansion/displacement model described by equation 5.
One can see that for both rates, δEobs responds positively
to an impulsive risk function at t¯ over nearly the entire
time that advanced life could have arisen in the past.
Only at the earliest possible times will introducing danger
result in reduced estimates for the number of observable
K3+’s. This means that a realistic risk function, spread
over all earlier times, would need to have very special
properties to result in lower estimates for K3+ visibility.
Previous published results used a rate similar to F2
from figure 1a, and modulated it with two increasingly
severe models of extinction events at earlier times, sup-
pressing early values of F [14]. In every single case out of
81 scenarios, including 3 different typicality assumptions
(mean time of arrival, mean + σ, and mean + 2σ) and
9 different expansion velocities, moving from a relatively
“safer” to a “more dangerous” early universe resulted in
larger estimates for the number of visible K3+’s.
In an earlier context, where the study of high-energy
extinction events was focused on the Milky Way galaxy
itself, an observer-selection effect was repeatedly empha-
sized by Vukotic´ and C´irkovic´ [2–4], who pointed out that
newly proposed galaxy-scale extinction events should not
dissuade traditional SETI searches within the Milky Way.
The idea being that if high-energy events have recently
become rare enough for us to appear, others may be
appearing at nearly the same time. Indeed, they went
4(a)
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FIG. 1: Two appearance-rate models are given in (a),
with respect to which (b) shows four responses in the
expected number of visible K3+’s induced by an
“impulsive risk function” concentrated at cosmic time t¯,
i.e. δF (t) = − δ(t− t¯). Both mean and median time of
arrival assumptions are shown. Introducing danger at t¯
increases the expected number of visible K3+’s for
nearly the entire time that life could plausibly have
arisen in the past. Displacement model used is given by
equation 5, with v = .3c.
further to point out that such extinction models actu-
ally undermine earlier anthropic arguments [26] for SETI
contact pessimism. However, they took early life-hostile
conditions due to gamma ray bursts to imply a “com-
plete lack of any extragalactic intelligent signals or phe-
nomena” [3] – the opposite of the conclusions here. The
crucial difference in our analysis is made by including
the displacement of habitable worlds. Although our ar-
guments are quite different in scope and structure, we
find the parallels (and contrasts) interesting.
In passing, we note that higher estimates for the num-
ber of visible K3+’s do not imply the estimates are large
in an absolute sense. It is not difficult to propose param-
eters that result in Eobs that is substantially less than
one. For example, this will be the case if mature tech-
nology makes v >∼ .9c expansion easy enough that it be-
comes the dominant expansionistic behavior [14]. The
anthropic effect described here mainly shows that early
hostile conditions cannot be a self-contained explanation
for the Great Silence, as far as extragalactic life is con-
cerned.
I am pleased to acknowledge Milan C´irkovic´ for his
helpful comments and suggestions.
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